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Executive Summary 
 
“Good time” – or “earned time”, as it is called in Iowa – is a vehicle by which incarcerated 
inmates are able to earn time off their sentences beyond the time they actually serve.  In Iowa, 
for example, imprisoned inmates exhibiting good behavior earn 1.2 additional days off their 
sentences for each day served so that, for example, a Class C sentence with a maximum term of 
ten years can actually expire in just over 4.5 years. 
 
Earned time policies were created to serve two critical functions: 1) to allow for the management 
of prison populations by releasing compliant inmates while keeping inmates incarcerated who 
are believed to pose more societal risk; and 2) to promote positive inmate behavior while 
incarcerated, ensuring the safety of other inmates and correctional staff. The purpose of this 
analysis is to examine the latter contention: do earned time policies achieve their intended 
purpose by reducing institutional misconduct?  
 
Institutional misconduct rates were examined among inmates who were newly admitted to prison 
between FY2006-FY2008 after originally having been charged with either Robbery-1 or 
Robbery-2. A conviction under either of these offenses requires serving a mandatory minimum 
sentence of 70 percent of the maximum prison sentence before being eligible for release. A 
second component to these mandatory minimum sentences is the limited accrual of earned time, 
capped at 15 percent to be applied after 70 percent of the sentence has been served.  This 
analysis compares misconduct rates between offenders serving a 70 percent sentence and 
offenders who escaped the mandatory minimum and were convicted of an alternative (non-70%) 
crime. Offenders in this analysis are referred to as the 70 percent and non-70 percent groups.  
 
The analysis provided the following findings: 
 
 Inmates serving non-70 percent sentences tended to have higher amounts of total 
misconduct than the 70 percent group during year-two and -three of incarceration when 
examining independent incarceration years (i.e. not cumulatively). 
 
 Misconduct rates tended to decrease for both the 70 percent and non-70 percent groups as 
release approached, although this reduction occurred much earlier for the 70 percent 
group.  
o Misconduct rates began to decrease for the 70 percent group around five-and-one-
half years prior to release and hovered around zero to six percent until release, 
while misconduct rates began to decrease for the non-70 percent group only 
within the last year-and-one-half of incarceration.  
 
 Age was one of the strongest and most consistent significant predictors of institutional 
misconduct. Significant predictors of misconduct during years-two and –three of 
incarceration also included offender custody classification and facility security level. It is 
important to note that sentence type (70% or non-70%) was not found to be a significant 
predictor of offender misconduct.  
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While the findings from this report appear to suggest that earned time has little influence on 
offender misconduct, it is important to acknowledge the possible effects that removal or 
modification of the policy could have on misconduct rates. While findings suggest that the rates 
of misconduct are higher for the non-70% than the 70 percent group, it is possible that, absent 
earned time policies, misconduct rates could increase or decrease.  
 
It should also be remembered that our findings relate specifically to a certain group of offenders 
(i.e., inmates originally charged with robbery) who are not necessarily representative of prison 
inmates as a whole.  The analysis also occurs within a unique sentencing structure that contains 
element of both indeterminate and determinate sentencing.   
 
It should also be said that these findings should not necessarily suggest abolishment or 
modification of current earned time practices.  Simply doing away with earned time, within 
Iowa’s current sentencing structure, would result in a nearly immediate rise in prison population.  
Without earned time, a ten-year sentence would actually expire in ten years rather than the 
current 4.54 years, a change likely to delay discretionary releases (i.e., paroles and work 
releases) as well as expirations of sentence.  While abolishing or reducing the opportunity for 
earned time may be attractive in terms of “truth in sentencing,” such a change should not be 
made without considering the possible impact on the size of Iowa’s prison population. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Declining crime rates in the 1990’s were said to be attributable to the enactment of harsher sentences 
in the 1970’s and 1980’s, when the ‘get tough on crime’ initiative became widely popular. This 
initiative gained popularity as the public began to believe that harsher sentences would deter more 
crime.1 This initiative supported long mandatory penalties and determinate sentencing for offenders 
who commit certain crimes. The goal of this strategy was to increase incapacitation of some groups 
of offenders, many of whom were violent, used a weapon, or were habitual offenders or high-profile 
drug traffickers.2   
 
Determinate sentencing was believed to promote specific and general deterrence. Specific deterrence 
addresses criminal behavior which is avoided through the direct incapacitation and punishment of an 
offender. General deterrence refers to the avoidance of criminal behavior by non-offenders due to 
fear of legal punishment.  
 
While determinate sentencing and mandatory penalties fostered lengthy incarceration of some violent 
offenders who were a threat to public safety, it also caused prison populations to escalate3 and proved 
to be quite costly, with little known effect on general deterrence.4 5  
 
In the mid-1990’s, critics arose to challenge determinate sentencing and mandatory penalties due to   
their disproportionate effects on racial minorities and the impoverished.6 Additionally, judges 
criticized these policies because they limited judges’ discretion in sentencing.7 As support declined 
for mandatory penalties which required a one-size-fits-all sentencing approach, advocacy grew for 
individualized sentencing which focused on offender rehabilitation. “Under indeterminate 
sentencing, the judge specifies only the maximum sentence length of a prison term imposed and a 
release authority (parole board) later determines how long the offender will serve”.8 Indeterminate 
sentencing allows correctional discretion for determining when an offender is ready for community 
release.  
 
Iowa’s current sentencing system is a mixture of indeterminate and determinate sentencing, 
depending on the offense.  Determinate sentencing through the use of mandatory minimums is 
reserved for certain forcible felonies identified in Iowa Code §702.11, while other crimes not covered 
under this initiative are not subject to the mandatory minimums.   
 
The mandatory minimum sentences prescribed in Iowa Code §902.12 require that offenders serve a 
mandatory of 70 percent of their sentence before being eligible for parole. These sentences allow 
only a 15 percent window between 70 percent and 85 percent during which the Board of Parole may 
consider early release, as the accumulation of earned time is limited to 15 percent (reducing the 100 
                                                          
1 Political Research Associates. The Rise of the Modern “Tough on Crime” Movement. 
http://www.publiceye.org/defendingjustice/pdfs/chapters/toughcrime.pdf 
2 Lynch, J.P., & Sabol, W.J. (1997). Did Getting Tough on Crime Pay? Urban Institute. Crime Policy Report No.1.  
3 Ditton, P.M., & Wilson, D.J. (1999). Trust in Sentencing in State Prisons. BJA Special Report.  
4 Vincent, B.S., & Hofer, P.J. (1994). The Consequences of Mandatory Minimum Prison Terms: A Summary of Recent Findings.  
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/conmanmin.pdf/$file/conmanmin.pdf 
5 Iowa has used mandatory minimum sentencing for years,5 mandatory minimums were expanded and lengthened following the 
1994 Truth in Sentencing/Violent Offender Incarceration (TIS/VOI) Act.   
6 Johnson, B. L. (2004). Sentencing Reform Act (1984): Major Acts of Congress. http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-
3407400268.html 
7 Ibid. 
8 The Division of Criminal and Juvenile Justice Planning. (1997). Iowa Criminal and Juvenile Justice Plan -- 1997 Update. p.7. 
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percent maximum to 85 percent).  Offenses covered by the 70 percent initiative are listed in the table 
below. 
 
Table 1: Violent Offenses Covered by the 70% Initiative 
Code Citation Year Offense Description Class Maximum Minimum 
707.11  (1998) Attempted Murder B Felony 25 years 17.5 years 
707.3  (1996) Murder 2
nd
 Degree B+ Felony 50 years 35 years 
707.6A(1)  (2003) Homicide by Vehicle B Felony 25 years 17.5 years 
707.6A(2)  (2003) Homicide by Vehicle C Felony 10 years   7.0 years 
709.3  (2005) Sex Abuse 2
nd
 Degree B Felony 25 years 17.5 years 
710.3  (1996) Kidnapping 2
nd
 Degree B Felony 25 years 17.5 years 
711.2  (2003) Robbery 1
st
 Degree B Felony 25 years 17.5 years 
711.3  (2003) Robbery 2
nd
 Degree C Felony 10 years   7.0 years 
902.8,A   (1978)
9
 Habitual Criminal Other Felony 15 years 10.5 years 
 
Offenders who are not convicted of one of these crimes have the opportunity to begin earning earned 
time at the start of their sentence. As a practical matter, the Department of Corrections applies all 
earned time at admission, calculating a tentative discharge date based upon the reduced term.  If 
earned time is lost, the tentative discharge date is recalculated.  Generally, inmates not serving 
mandatory terms are able to reduce their sentence by slightly more than 50% with good behavior 
during incarceration. Offenders who commit misconduct violations may forfeit earned time, thus 
delaying their prison release.  
 
Earned time is believed to serve two critical functions. First, it allows for the management of prison 
populations by releasing compliant inmates while keeping inmates who are believed to pose more 
societal risk. Second, earned time is believed to promote positive inmate behavior during 
incarceration.  
 
“Critics maintain that these justifications are unsound and that prior or prison behavior is not an 
accurate prediction of future recidivism,” while “proponents of ‘earned time’ maintain its use 
accelerates inmate release and relieves prison overcrowding, arguing that the credit assists in 
maintaining order and discipline, rehabilitation offenders, mitigating sentence severity, allowing an 
accurate prediction of an inmate’s release date, and encouraging rehabilitation.”10  In Iowa, “earned 
time is viewed by justice system professionals as a very necessary behavioral tool and its elimination 
would be detrimental”.11 
 
The existence of mandatory minimums provides an opportunity to examine the impact of earned- 
time in the Iowa prison system.  In addition to prison population management, another rationale for 
establishing earned time was to control institutional behavior. One might hypothesize that those 
eligible for limited earned time might be involved in much more institutional misconduct because 
there is less incentive for them to behave.  This study is an effort to examine this contention.  Does 
earned time achieve its intended purpose? 
                                                          
9 For the purpose of this report habitual criminal convictions are counted only when the underlying conviction is for an offense 
covered by the 70% mandatory minimum. 
10 Edwards, T. (2001). Correctional Earned-time Credits in Southern States. Retrieved from: 
http://www.slcatlanta.org/Publications/HSPS/GoodTime.pdf. 
11 The Division of Criminal and Juvenile Justice Planning. (1997). Iowa Criminal and Juvenile Justice Plan -- 1997 Update. p.8. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
A review of the literature largely suggests that misconduct violations are not normally distributed 
within inmate populations. Generally, misconduct has been found to vary by individual-level 
factors such as race, age, and sex as well as prison-level factors such as prison population size, 
sentencing system, facility security level, inmate custody classification, and inmate sentence type 
and length.  
 
Individual Factors that Influence Misconduct 
Young inmates tend to exhibit higher amounts of institutional misconduct.
12
 When compared to 
other offender variables such as “education level, gang affiliation, offense conviction, and 
sentence length, age is found to be the most consistent and strongest determinant of prison 
violence, with those younger than 18 at entrance to prison being far more likely than adults to be 
involved in various levels of prison misconduct and violence.”13  
 
Race is also found to be a correlate of misconduct, with African-Americans exhibiting higher 
rates of misconduct.
14
 One study found that African-American inmates had lower rates of 
alcohol/drug misconduct but higher rates of violent misconduct compared to Caucasians.
15
 
Racial bias may also influence who receives a misconduct write-up, as one study indicated that 
“disproportionally more conduct reports (shots) were written on Black than White inmates.”16  
 
Lastly, male offenders tend to have higher rates of violent prison behavior than female 
offenders.
17
  
 
Prison-Level Factors that Influence Misconduct 
There are mixed findings as to the effects of prison overcrowding on inmate misconduct.
18
 While 
some studies argue that overcrowding is correlated with institutional misconduct,
19
 others 
contend that “prison crowding has little substantive impact on misconduct”.20 It is also suggested 
that aggressive inmates tend to commit more assaults in facilities that have high populations and 
have higher proportions of young inmates.
21
  Additional analysis suggests that “overcrowding is 
                                                          
12 Goetting. A., & Howsen, R.M. (1986). Correlates of prisoner misconduct. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, Vol. 2, No. 1, 
49-67.  
13 Kuanliang, A., Sorensen, J.R., & Cunningham, M.D. (2008). Juvenile inmates in an adult prison system, Rates of disciplinary 
misconduct and violence. Criminal Justice and Behavior. Vol 35. No. 9, 1186-1201.  
14 Goetting. A., & Howsen, R.M. (1986). Correlates of prisoner misconduct. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, Vol. 2, No. 1. 
49-67. 
15 Harer. M.D., & Steffensmeier, D.J. (1996). Race and prison violence. Criminology, 34, 323-355.  
16 Ramirez, J. 1983. Race and the apprehension of inmate misconduct. Journal of Criminal Justice. Volume 11, Issue 5, 413-427.  
17 Harer, M.D., & Langan, N.P. (2001). Gender differences in predictors of prison violence: Assessing the predictive validity of a 
risk classification system. Crime & Delinquency. Vol. 47, No. 4, 513-536.  
18 Wooldredge, J., & Steiner, B. (2009). Comparing methods for examining relationships between prison crowding and inmate 
violence. Justice Quarterly. Vol. 26, Issue 4, 795-826. 
19 United States Government Accountability Office. (2012, September). Unknown, Bureau of Prisons: Growing inmate crowding 
negatively affects inmates, staff and infrastructure. (Publication No. GAO-12-743). Retrieved from:(2012). 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=261657. 
20 Franklin, T.W., Franklin, C.A., & Pratt, T.C. (2006). Examining the empirical relationship between prison crowding and 
inmate misconduct: A meta-analysis of conflicting research results. Journal of Criminal Justice. Vol. 34, Issue 4, 401-412.  
21 Lahm, K.F. (2008). Inmate-on-inmate assault: A multilevel examination of prison violence. Criminal Justice and Behavior. 
Vol. 35. No.1, 120-137.  
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not related to violence when security level is controlled.”22 Another prison-level factor which 
may influence inmate misconduct is offender custody level. A recent study found that “custody 
levels were strongly and positively associated with misconduct.”23  
 
Some suggest that transitions from an indeterminate to a determinate sentencing structure may 
contribute to higher rates of inmate misconduct, as indeterminate systems appear to possess more 
ability to reward good behavior.   A recent analysis observed variations in misconduct prior to 
and after “truth in sentencing” over a twelve-year period and found that generally “determinate 
punishment has had the unintended consequence of significantly increasing the level of inmate 
misconduct in general and across different type of misconduct; violent, property, and 
disorderly.”24  
 
In comparing misconduct rates of inmates serving determinate versus indeterminate sentences 
the research reports mixed results. It has been argued that earned time is an ineffective 
misconduct deterrent because the number of days lost is often restricted
25
 and lost earned time is 
applied at the end of an offender’s sentence, which is often too far into the future to have an 
impact.
26
 Some studies suggest that inmates who have the opportunity to earn earned time have 
less misconduct than those who do not have this option, although the authors suggest that this 
effect may be attributable to other factors such as time and offense type.
27
 Other studies find that 
inmates who do not have the ability to earn earned time, such as life-without-parole inmates have 
misconduct rates similar to other inmates serving long sentences.
28
  
 
Inmates serving determinate sentences tend to have longer sentences. Early research suggests 
that while short- and long-term inmates have similar types of in-prison misconduct, short-term 
inmates have significantly higher amounts of misconduct.
29
 More recent analysis finds variation 
in misconduct types, reporting that nonviolent and institutional offenses are committed more 
frequently by inmates serving long (10+ years) and medium-terms (2-10 years) than those 
serving short-term (less than 2 years).
30
 Other analysis finds that “an inmate’s sentence length is 
not related to infraction rates during incarceration…”31 
 
                                                          
22 Brooks, C.A. (2004). Overcrowding and violence in federal correctional institutions: An empirical analysis. 
http://dspace.library.drexel.edu/bitstream/1860/292/7/brooks_crystal_thesis.pdf 
23 Worrall, J.L., & Morris, R.G. (2011). Inmate custody levels and prison rule violations. The Prison Journal. Vol. 91. No.2, 131-
157. 
24 Bales, W.D., & Miller, C.H. (2012). The impact of determinate sentencing on prisoner misconduct. Journal of Criminal 
Justice. Volume 40, Issue 5, 394-403. 
25 Forst, M.L., & Brady, J.M. (1983) in Antonowicz, D.H., & Ross., R.R. (1997). The philosophy and practice of corrections. 
p.61.  
26 Forst, M.L. (1981). Effects of determinate sentencing on prison disciplinary procedures and inmate misconduct. Unpublished 
manuscript. in Antonowicz, D.H., & Ross., R.R. (1997). The Philosophy and Practice of Corrections. p.61. 
27 Emshoff, J.G., & Davidson, W.S. (1987). The effect of “good time” credit on inmate behavior: A quasi-experiment. Criminal 
Justice and Behavior. Vol. 14, No.3, 335-351. 
28 Cunningham, M.D., & Sorensen, J.R. (2006). Nothing to lose? A comparative examination of prison misconduct rates among 
life-without-parole and other long-term high-security inmates. Criminal Justice and Behavior. Vol. 33, No.6, 683-705. 
29 Flanagan, T.J. (1980). Time served and institutional misconduct: Patterns of involvement in disciplinary infractions among 
long-term and short-term inmates. Journal of Criminal Justice. Volume 8, Issue. 6, 357-367.  
30 Thompson, C., & Loper, A.B. (2005). Adjustment patterns in incarcerated women: An analysis of differences based on 
sentence length. Criminal Justice and Behavior. Vol. 32. No.6, 714-732.  
31 Fernandez, K.E., & Neiman, M. (1998). California’s inmate classification system: Predicting inmate misconduct. The Prison 
Journal. Vol. 78. No. 4, 406-422. 
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“Although any policy that involves shorter lengths of stay for inmates raises concerns about 
public safety, states with earned time provisions have seen recidivism rates either remain 
unchanged or actually drop”.32 Severed community ties and longer associations with hardened 
criminals have been suggested reasons as to why inmates serving longer prison sentences, such 
as those requiring a mandatory minimum, may have higher recidivism rates than those serving 
shorter prison terms.  
 
Institutional Misconduct and Recidivism 
As previously stated, one of the primary functions of earned time is to allow for the management 
of prison populations by enabling the release of compliant inmates while delaying release of 
inmates who are believed to pose more societal risk. It is unclear as to the extent to which 
institutional behavior reflects behavior while in the community, although recidivism research 
finds that “inmates who engage in misconduct, violent misconduct in particular, are more likely 
to recidivate” once released.33 
 
 
 
                                                          
32 Lawrence, A. (2009) Cutting Corrections Costs: Earned Time Policies for State Prisoners. p.1. 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/earned_time_report.pdf 
33 Cochran, J.C., Mears, D.P., Bales, W.D., & Stewart, E.A. (2012). Does inmate behavior affect post-release offending? 
Investigating the misconduct-recidivism relationship among youth and adults. Justice Quarterly. 1-30.  
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III. Earned Time Policy 
 
Per Iowa Code §903A.2 offenders can receive a sentence reduction through the accrual of earned 
time. For each day served, inmates earn an additional 1.2 days credit on their sentences. Earned 
time credits are applied to all sentences at time of prison entry with the exception of 70 percent 
mandatory minimum sentences reserved for sexual predator convictions or forcible felonies. For 
these offenses, earned time is applied only after the mandatory sentence has been completed. 
Also, sex offenders required to participate in sex offender treatment are not eligible for earned 
time unless they participate in and complete treatment. Specific language from the Iowa Code 
§903A.2 is presented below. 
 
1. Each inmate committed to the custody of the director of the department of corrections is 
eligible to earn a reduction of sentence in the manner provided in this section. For 
purposes of calculating the amount of time by which an inmate’s sentence may be 
reduced, inmates shall be grouped into the following two sentencing categories: 
 
a. Category “A” sentences are those sentences which are not subject to a maximum 
accumulation of earned time of fifteen percent of the total sentence of confinement under 
section 902.12. To the extent provided in subsection 5, category “A” sentences also 
include life sentences imposed under section 902.1. An inmate of an institution under the 
control of the department of corrections who is serving a category “A” sentence is eligible 
for a reduction of sentence equal to one and two-tenths days for each day the inmate 
demonstrates good conduct and satisfactorily participates in any program or placement 
status identified by the director to earn the reduction. The programs include but are not 
limited to the following:  
(1) Employment in the institution. 
 (2) Iowa state industries.  
(3) An employment program established by the director.  
(4) A treatment program established by the director.  
(5) An inmate educational program approved by the director. 
 
However, an inmate required to participate in a sex offender treatment program shall not 
be eligible for a reduction of sentence unless the inmate participates in and completes a 
sex offender treatment program established by the director. An inmate serving a category 
“A” sentence is eligible for an additional reduction of sentence of up to three hundred 
sixty-five days of the full term of the sentence of the inmate for exemplary acts. In 
accordance with section 903A.4, the director shall by policy identify what constitutes an 
exemplary act that may warrant an additional reduction of sentence. 
 
b. Category “B” sentences are those sentences which are subject to a maximum 
accumulation of earned time of fifteen percent of the total sentence of confinement under 
section 902.12. An inmate of an institution under the control of the department of 
corrections who is serving a category “B” sentence is eligible for a reduction of sentence 
equal to fifteen eighty-fifths of a day for each day of good conduct by the inmate. 
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2. Earned time accrued pursuant to this section may be forfeited in the manner prescribed 
in section 903A.3. 
 
3. Time served in a jail, municipal holding facility, or another facility prior to actual 
placement in an institution under the control of the department of corrections and credited 
against the sentence by the court shall accrue for the purpose of reduction of sentence 
under this section. Time which elapses during an escape shall not accrue for purposes of 
reduction of sentence under this section. 
 
4. Time which elapses between the date on which a person is incarcerated, based upon a 
determination of the board of parole that a violation of parole has occurred, and the date 
on which the violation of parole was committed shall not accrue for purposes of reduction 
of sentence under this section. 
 
5. Earned time accrued by inmates serving life sentences imposed under section 902.1 
shall not reduce the life sentence, but shall be credited against the inmate’s sentence if the 
life sentence is commuted to a term of years under section 902.2. 83 Acts, ch 147, §3, 14, 
15; 90 Acts, ch 1251, §67; 96 Acts, ch 1151, §4; 97 Acts, ch 131, §2, 4; 98 Acts, ch 1100, 
§88; 2000 Acts, ch 1173, §4, 10; 2003 Acts, 1st Ex, ch 2, §52, 209; 2005 Acts, ch 158, 
§32; 2011 Acts, ch 22, §2 Referred to in §822.2, 901.5A, 903A.4, 903A.7, 903B.1, 903B.2 
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IV. Methodology 
 
Proponents of earned time provisions argue that early release available through the accrual of 
earned time increases positive behavior during incarceration. The purpose of this analysis is to 
examine this contention. Misconduct violations were observed between two groups: individuals 
who have the ability to earn earned time (comparison group) and those who may only accrue 
limited earned time due to a mandatory sentence (study group).The comparison group includes 
offenders who are not serving 70 percent mandatory minimum sentences while the study group 
includes offenders who are serving such sentences.  
 
There are two components to these 70 percent “mandatory sentences” in Iowa that should be 
noted:   
 the first is the mandatory minimum sentence itself, which is currently set at 70 percent of 
the statutory maximum penalty for the applicable felonies (i.e., 7.0 years for a Class C 
felony and 17.5 years for a Class B felony);  
 the second component is a “cap” on the amount of earned time that can be accumulated 
during the course of the sentence, a figure currently set at 15%.  Thus, a Class B felony 
covered by this provision, with the accumulation of earned time, will expire at 22.5 years.  
A class C felony will expire in 8.5 years”.34 
 
The purpose of this analysis is to answer the following research questions:  
1.) Does having the ability to earn earned time affect an inmate’s misconduct 
engagement? 
2.) Which variables are most closely associated with offender misconduct? 
 
Data for this study were extracted from the Iowa Correctional Offender Network (ICON), 
maintained by the Iowa Department of Corrections. 
 
Study Groups 
The cohort for this analysis includes all new incoming inmates admitted to prison during 
FY2005-FY2008 whose original charges included either Robbery-1 or Robbery-2, regardless of 
whether the robbery was the most serious offense charged.  Robbery-1 carries a maximum 
sentence of twenty-five years, while Robbery-2 carries a ten-year maximum sentence. While all 
offenders were originally charged with either Robbery -1 or Robbery-2, some were convicted of 
lesser offenses. Offenders convicted of either a Robbery -1 or Robbery-2 made up the study 
group (70 percent group) and offenders convicted of lesser (non-robbery) offenses made up the 
comparison group (non-70 percent group).  
 
A cohort of 375 offenders was extracted from ICON. Thirty-nine non-mandatory sentence 
offenders were excluded from the analysis as their incarceration periods were less than one full 
year. A total of 336 offenders were studied, with 185 serving mandatory 70 percent sentences 
and 151 who were not. Offender misconduct was observed at one-, two-, and three-years of 
incarceration both cumulatively and during a specific incarceration year.  
 
                                                          
34
 Stageberg, P. & Rabey, S. (2013) An analysis of the use of 70% mandatory minimum sentences in Iowa.  
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Offenders eligible for earned time were released at much earlier periods compared to the 
mandatory sentence group, limiting the analysis to 151 non-70 percent offenders at one-year, 116 
at two-years, and 79 at three-years of incarceration.  
 
Table 2: Offenders Eligible for Observation by Time Incarcerated and Sentence Type 
 
 
Variables 
Independent Variables: Various independent variables were compared against rates of 
misconduct. Independent individual level variables included sex, race, and age. Sex was 
categorized dichotomously as female and male offenders. Race was categorized as Caucasian, 
African-American and Other. The other race category included offenders of Native American or 
Alaskan Native and Asian or Pacific Islander races. Age was calculated by observing offender 
age at prison entry. Offender age was categorized as 29 and younger and 30 and older.  
 
Other independent variables included prison-level factors such as custody level, facility security 
level and Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) total score. 
 
The Iowa Department of Corrections uses custody level classification to determine the 
appropriate facility security level for inmates. The process includes an annual review and 
potential reclassification. Reclassification to a less restrictive custody level “…is awarded by 
obeying rules and meeting other mandatory requirements. Other factors are also taken into 
consideration including pending charges, physical and mental health needs, risk to the 
community, risk to other offenders and staff, number and nature of infractions, and time since 
last infraction” 35 There are three types of custody levels:  
 
“Minimum Custody – This custody is the least restrictive and has the most privileges of 
the custody grades. Offenders in this level may work on the grounds away from the unit 
or away from the institution with appropriate supervision. 
 
Medium Custody – This custody is more restrictive than minimum custody. Offenders 
are generally restricted to working within the boundaries of the institution and are usually 
assigned to dormitory or cell setting in medium custody”.36 
 
Maximum Custody – This custody is more restrictive than medium custody. It is for 
those who may be an escape risk or have been convicted of violent crimes, or their 
actions in institutional setting have shown they may be a behavior problem. Maximum 
                                                          
35
 State of Iowa, Department of Corrections. 2010. An Introduction to Incarceration in Iowa. p. 6 
http://www.doc.state.ia.us/Documents/OffenderFamilyFriends/IowaIntroductiontoIncarceration.pdf 
36
 Ibid 
 Non-70% Sentence 70% Sentence Total 
Years Incarcerated N % N % N % 
Year-One  151 100% 185 100% 336 100% 
Year-Two  116 76.8% 185 100% 301 89.6% 
Year-Three  79 52.3% 185 100% 264 78.6% 
Total Offenders 151 -- 185 -- 336 -- 
 Johnson, S. 2014. An Analysis of the Effects of Earned-Time for Inmates Charged with Robbery 13 
 
custody housing is generally made up of single cells and divided into cellblocks within a 
building or unit. Offenders in this level are also under constant supervision.
37
 
 
Offenders were included in the analysis if their custody classification assessment submission 
date was within 60 days of their supervision start date. Offenders were eligible for analysis at 
year-two and year-three if they were reclassified within 60 days of their supervision start 
anniversary.  
 
Initial custody classification and reclassification information is also associated with assignments 
to a particular facility. Some facilities can have variations in security levels and can therefore 
accommodate various offender custody classes. There are three types of facility security levels 
distinguished in this analysis and include maximum, medium, and minimum security.  
 
The Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) is a validated risk assessment and is one of 
several tools used to indicate offender risk and level of supervision. LSI-R total scores which 
were submitted 180 days prior to prison admissions or 60 days following release were utilized, as 
this is considered the most accurate assessment by the Iowa Department of Corrections’ (IDOC) 
standards.  LSI-R total scores were categorized as follows: 0-13 low risk, 14-23 low-moderate 
risk, 24-33 moderate risk, 34-40 medium-high risk, 41+ high risk.  
 
Dependent Variable: The dependent variable in this analysis is misconduct. Misconduct 
information is entered into the ICON database by an officer on the day of the misconduct 
offense, although circumstances sometimes result in later data entry. The misconduct entered 
date is a used here as a proxy measure for when the offense occurred. Once a misconduct 
violation is submitted, a hearing occurs typically within seven working days to determine the 
guilt or innocence of an inmate.  Only violations receiving a hearing decision of guilty are 
included in this analysis.  
 
Misconduct violations in ICON are grouped into three categories: Predatory/Violence, 
Institutional Management, Non-Compliance (Control/Disruption of Facility) and Miscellaneous. 
Because the miscellaneous category is use only for very low-level offenses, specific analysis of 
this category is not included, although miscellaneous misconducts are included in total 
misconduct counts. A detailed list of specific rule violations and their categorization can be 
found in Attachment 1.  
 
Analyses 
This report examines the differences in misconduct between the 70 percent and non-70 percent 
groups.  
 
The first analysis examines variations in misconduct between the study and comparison groups 
during the first three years of incarceration. For this analysis, misconduct is measured both 
cumulatively and between particular incarceration years. Also observed are variations by 
misconduct type, including misconducts which were predatory/violent, institutional 
management, or non-compliant.  
 
                                                          
37
 Ibid. 
 Johnson, S. 2014. An Analysis of the Effects of Earned-Time for Inmates Charged with Robbery 14 
 
The second analysis is utilized to measure misconduct variations by time-to release among a 
smaller cohort of released offenders. This analysis also observes misconduct which resulted in 
lost earned time sanctions as release nears. Types of sanctions received as well as earned time 
lost are compared among the 70 percent and non-70 percent groups.  
 
The third analysis involves a logistic regression to measure which factors were most closely 
associated with misconduct. For this analysis various independent variables included age, sex, 
race, sentence type, convicting offense (violent or non-violent), LSI-R total score, custody 
classification, and facility security level. The dependent variable included any misconduct, 
predatory/violent misconduct, institutional management, and non-compliance misconduct. 
Variations in predictive powers were observed between particular incarceration years during the 
first three-years of incarceration.  
 
The final analysis compares variations in total misconduct and misconduct types by the 70 
percent and non-70 percent groups by independent-level factors such as age, race, and sex as 
well as prison-level factors including custody classification level, facility security level, and LSI-
R total score. Variations are observed between particular incarceration years during the first three 
years of incarceration.  
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V. Offender Demography 
 
Offenders in the study population tended to be male (89.6%) and a higher proportion were under 
the age of 29 (58.6%). Slightly more Caucasians (53.9%) were in the sample compared to 
African-Americans (44%).   
 
Significant differences did present upon observation of race and sex by sentence type. 
Caucasians were more likely to avoid the 70% sentence through a lesser conviction (62.2% vs. 
47.0%) while African-Americans were more likely to receive the mandatory sentence (50.3% vs. 
36.4%), findings which reached significance.
38
 Similarly, men were significantly more likely to 
receive the mandatory sentence (93.0% vs. 85.4%) while women were significantly more likely 
to not receive a 70% sentence (14.6% vs. 7.0%). Offenders younger than 29 were equally likely 
to have received and not received a mandatory sentence (59.6% vs. 57.8%). 
 
Table 3: Offender Demography by Sentence Type 
 Non-70% 70% Total 
 N % N % N % 
Prison Admission by Fiscal Year 
   2005 36 23.8% 61 33.0% 97 28.9% 
   2006 39 25.8% 41 22.2% 80 23.8% 
   2007 38 25.2% 40 21.6% 78 23.2% 
   2008 38 25.2% 43 23.2% 81 24.1% 
Race 
   Caucasian* 94 62.2% 87 47.0% 181 53.9% 
   African-American* 55 36.4% 93 50.3% 148 44.0% 
   Other 2 1.3% 5 2.7% 7 2.1% 
Sex 
   Male* 129 85.4% 172 93.0% 301 89.6% 
   Female* 22 14.6% 13 7.0% 35 10.4% 
Age at Prison Entry 
   29 and Younger 90 59.6% 107 57.8% 197 58.6% 
   30 and Older 61 40.4% 78 42.2% 139 41.4% 
Most Serious Convicting Offense 
   B Felony* 5 3.3% 46 24.9% 51 15.2% 
   C Felony 103 68.2% 139 75.1% 242 72.0% 
   D Felony* 32 21.2% -- -- 32 9.5% 
   Other Felony 4 2.6% -- -- 4 1.2% 
   Aggravated  Misdemeanor 5 3.3% -- -- 5 1.5% 
   Serious Misdemeanor 2 1.3% -- -- 2 0.6% 
Total Offenders 151 100% 185 100% 336 100% 
*Significant at a 95% confidence interval. 
 
 
 
                                                          
38
 Analysis elsewhere suggested that the discrepancy in charge reduction was due to a higher percentage of African-
Americans being initially charged with Robbery-1, an offense less likely to result in charge reduction than Robbery-
2.  See Stageberg and Rabey, op.cit. 
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VI. Findings 
 
Offender Misconduct within a Total Period of Incarceration 
 
The following information measures cumulative misconducts which occurred within a total 
period of incarceration. For example, misconducts which occurred during year-one will be 
included in misconduct measurements at year-two and year-three of incarceration. This portion 
of the report examines only the first three years of incarceration, as there were a small number of 
offenders in the non-70 percent group who were incarcerated after three years. The figure below 
includes all types of misconduct, including predatory/violence, institutional management, non-
compliance, and miscellaneous.   
 
During the first year of incarceration, about 62 percent of offenders received at least one  
misconduct violation. While the percentage of offenders with violations increased at year-two 
(76.7%) and year-three (83.5%) it is important to note that there are relatively few differences 
between the 70% and non-70% group.   
 
Figure 1: Cumulative Total Misconduct by Sentence Type 
 
Details in Exhibit A.  
 
The previous information identified the total number of offenders with any misconduct violation. 
The following information focuses only on violations which were categorized as predatory/ 
violence, institutional management, or non-compliance. For a complete list of how rule 
violations were coded, please see Attachment 1. Note that offenders can be counted in more than 
one offense-type category but are only counted once within a category. 
 
While the previous chart identifies the total percent of offenders with any misconduct, the 
following chart identifies, of those offenders with any misconduct the types of misconduct that 
were performed. Offenders in the 70 percent and non-70 percent groups exhibited similar 
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percentages of predatory/violence and non-compliance violations throughout the three years of 
observation. Offenders in both groups showed similar percentages of institutional misconduct 
violations during year-one.  At year-two the 70 percent group had a slightly higher percentage of 
institutional management misconducts (65.5% vs. 59.5%), although by year-three the non-70% 
group had the highest percentages (80.3% vs. 70.5%). The cumulative percentage of non-
compliance misconducts for the non-70% group fell in year-three. This drop is attributable to the 
release of non-70% inmates during year-three and the retention of inmates who had not had non-
compliance misconduct.  
Figure 2: Cumulative Misconduct by Sentence Type and Misconduct Type 
 
Details in Exhibit A.  
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Offender Misconduct between Particular Years of Incarceration 
 
An additional way to observe misconduct violations is by measuring misconducts occurring 
within a particular year of incarceration (i.e., not cumulatively).  For example, misconducts 
which occurred during year-one will only be presented as year-one misconducts, similarly with 
year-two and year-three. Information is presented in this way to identify if there are increases or 
declines in the number of misconducts and types of misconduct between particular years of 
incarceration.   
 
As shown above, the number of offenders with misconduct violations was fairly proportional for 
the 70 percent and non-70 percent groups during year-one. Misconducts declined for both groups 
by year-three, although there were significantly
39
 higher percentages of non-70 percent offenders 
with misconduct violations than the 70 percent group in the latter two years. The figure below 
includes all types of misconduct, including predatory/violence, institutional management, non-
compliance, and miscellaneous.   
 
Figure 3: Misconduct between Particular Years of Incarceration by Sentence Type 
 
Details in Exhibit B.  
 
The previous information identified the total number of offenders with any misconduct 
violations. The following information focuses on types of violations (predatory/violence, 
institutional management, or non-compliance). Please note that offenders can be counted in more 
than one offense type category but are only counted once within a category. For a complete list 
of how rule violations were coded please see Attachment 1.  
 
Non-compliant misconduct violations tend to be more common than other types of misconduct. 
The percentage of offenders with non-compliant misconduct violations remained fairly stable 
through the observed period, although there was a higher percentage of non-70 percent offenders 
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 Significance was calculated at a 95% confidence level. 
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who had misconducts in this category, compared to the 70 percent group (98.7% vs. 89.9%) 
during year-two.  The number of offenders with institutional management and/or 
predatory/violence misconducts tended to rise as time passed for the non-70 percent group. 
Institutional management misconducts were similar for both groups during year one, but during 
year-two the percentage rose for the 70 percent group while it remained somewhat stable for the 
non-70 percent group. By year-three the non-70 percent group had significantly higher 
proportions of institutional misconducts than the 70% group (75.5% vs. 55.7%). Offenders of 
both groups tended to have fairly similar percentages of predatory/violence misconducts through 
the observed periods.  
 
Figure 4: Misconduct between Particular Years of Incarceration by Sentence Type and Misconduct Type 
 
Details in Exhibit B. 
 
For consistency purposes, the remaining portions of this analysis will focuses on misconducts 
which occur within a particular year of incarceration as opposed to observing cumulative 
misconduct violations.  
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Misconducts by Time to Release 
 
An alternative hypothesis in studying earned time contends that as release nears, offenders 
should receive fewer violations as early release is increasingly incentivized. To examine this 
contention, misconducts were measured in months prior to release. This analysis included 144 
non-70-percent offenders and 73 70-percent offenders who exited prison. The data show that 
about 23 percent of non-70-percent offenders (33) and about 16 percent of offenders serving 
mandatory terms (12) had no in-prison misconducts.  
 
A second analysis examined offenders who exited prison with at least one guilty misconduct 
violation. This group included 111 non-70-percent offenders and 61 70-percent offenders.  The 
following information presents the percentage of offenders with misconduct violations during a 
particular period of incarceration prior to prison release. Only a small portion of the non-70 
percent group had over 78 months of incarceration due to their shorter sentences; misconduct 
violations past this point were not examined due to the small comparison group sample.  
 
Misconduct violations were higher for the non-70 percent than the 70 percent group during most 
periods of incarceration. The percentage of 70-percent offenders with misconduct violations 
remained very low for the last five-and-one-half years prior to prison exit, ranging from 0% to 
6.6%, however, the non-70 percent group’s misconduct violations percentages ranged from  
4.5%-35%. The last year-and-one-half of incarceration for the non-70 percent group revealed a 
stark decrease in the percentage of offenders with misconduct violations. This suggests that 
earned time has more of a deterrent effect during later periods of incarceration, particularly for 
the non-70 percent group. It also appears that the incentive for early release for the 70 percent 
group has little effect on inmate behavior.  
 
As previously stated, the following information only includes information on a released cohort.  
Figure 5: Percent of Offenders w/Misconduct by Months to Release 
 
Details in Exhibit C.  
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It is important to note that a misconduct violation does not always imply that an offender will 
receive a sanction. A sanction may be ‘suspended’ if an offender avoids misconduct for a certain 
period of time.  The information below outlines misconduct violation earned time sanctions 
which were not suspended, meaning that offenders did not have the opportunity to maintain good 
behavior in hopes of avoiding a sanction associated with an earned time reduction.  
 
Infractions resulting in lost earned time tend to decrease as offenders approach their release. It 
appears that infractions resulting in lost earned time are most likely to occur at the beginning of 
an offender’s imprisonment. However, non-70 percent offenders continue to have higher rates of 
earned time lost sanctions than 70 percent offenders. It is important to acknowledge that the 70 
percent group tends to serve longer sentences than the non-70 percent group, therefore the lower 
rates of lost earned time infractions could be influenced by prison acclimation.  
 
Figure 6: Infractions Resulting in Loss of Earned time by Time to Release 
 
Details in Exhibit C.  
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If we restrict this analysis to offenders convicted of Class C Felonies we see similar trends in 
unsuspended earned time sanctions. Offenders, regardless of their sentence type, tend to have 
fewer infractions as their release dates approached. Offenders serving non-70% sentences have a 
greater number of infractions resulting in the unsuspended loss of earned time regardless of time 
to release. Again, non-70%ers have higher rates of misconduct. 
 
Figure 7: Unsuspended Infractions Resulting in Loss of Earned time for Offenders Convicted of a C-Felony 
 
Details in Exhibit C. 
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Misconduct Sanctions 
 
While the findings above indicate that sanctions resulting in lost earned time are greater for the 
non-70 percent group during incarceration, the previous analysis found that both cohorts tended 
to commit similar rates of misconduct violations. This begs the question, is the 70 percent group 
simply receiving alternative sanctions besides earned time loss?   
 
This portion of the report examines the sanctions received by the original cohort within the first 
three years of incarceration. Examining sanctions over the course of total incarceration is not a 
useful analysis due to the lengthier incarceration of the 70% group.  
 
Most offenders (84.2%) received at least one sanction for misconduct at some point during 
incarceration. Of offenders who received a misconduct violation, 92.9 percent had a violation 
which qualified for loss of earned time. There were few differences between non-70 percent 
inmates and 70 percent inmates in most sanctions, although the 70% group contained higher 
rates of offenders with confiscation (23.8% vs. 22.7%), reprimand (23.8% vs. 21.8%), assess 
costs (29.9% vs. 22.7%), cell/room confinement or restriction (70.1% vs. 59.7%), and 
disciplinary detention (89.6% vs. 81.5%) sanctions.  
 
Figure 8: Offender-Based Misconduct Violation Sanctions  
 
Details in Exhibit D. 
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As previously stated, it is important to note that a misconduct violation does not always imply 
that an offender will receive a sanction. A correctional violation may result in a suspended 
sentence or deferred judgment; therefore a sanction may not be imposed if an offender avoids 
further misconduct for a certain period of time.  The information below outlines misconduct 
violations which resulted in loss of earned time. Offenders are only counted once within each 
category below, but they could be represented in more than one category in the event of multiple 
infractions.  
 
Regardless of the smaller percentages of earned time available for the 70 percent group, this 
offender group had similar total percentages of offenders with lost earned time sanctions (87.4% 
vs. 86.8%). Offenders serving 70 percent sentences tended to have longer lost earned time 
sanctions than the non-70 percent group in all but one category (8-14 days).  
 
Figure 9: Offender-Based Earned Time Sanctions by Amount of Earned Time Lost 
 
Details in Exhibit D. 
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Factors that Predict Misconduct 
 
Factors that were found to be significant predictors of offender misconduct among the sample 
were offender age at prison entry, custody classification, and facility security level. Age was one 
of the strongest and most consistent predictors of misconduct. Custody classification and facility 
security level also proved to be significant predictors, but at later periods of incarceration. Also, 
sex was a significant factor of predatory misconduct at year-one. It is important to note that 
offender sentence type (70% or non-70%) was not a significant factor predictive of misconduct 
violations. Details concerning these findings can be found in Exhibit E.  
 
Logistic regression measures the association between a categorical dependent variable and one or 
more independent variables. This analysis uses logistic regression to measure the predictive 
power of individual- and prison-level factors against a dichotomous misconduct measure within 
individual years of incarceration.  
 
The regression analysis during year-one incarceration did not incorporate the variable ‘facility 
security level’ because all offenders were supervised in medium security facilities. Convicting 
offense type was categorized as violent and non-violent. For a complete list of variables included 
in the regression please see Exhibit E.  
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Variations in Misconduct by Sentence Type and Various Individual and 
Prison-level Factors 
 
The following information examines variations in misconduct between the 70 percent and non-
70 percent group by various individual-level factors such as age, race, and sex as well as prison-
level factors such as custody classification, prison security level, and LSI-R sore. For consistency 
purposes, the information below examines misconducts which occurred within a particular year 
of incarceration.  
 
Age 
Some research suggests that the age of an offender influences the rate of in-prison misconducts. 
For the purposes of this study, age was defined as an offender’s age at prison entry. It appears 
that age does influence misconduct rates, with younger offenders having higher percentages of 
misconducts than older offenders. The percentage of offenders with misconducts consistently 
decreases from year-one to year-three for offenders 30 years of age and older.  This figure 
remains stable from year-one to year-two, then decreases in year-three for the 29-and-younger 70 
percent group. Misconducts increase from year-one to year-two and remain stable from year-two 
to year-three for the 29-and-younger non-70 percent group. 
 
There appears to be relatively few differences between the groups by sentence type, although 
there was a noteworthy difference in year-three between the two younger groups. Because there 
were limited offenders under the age of 18 serving a 70 percent sentence, a comparison of 
misconduct violations by sentence type was inappropriate for this group.  
 
Figure 10: Offender Misconducts by Sentence Type and Age at Prison Entry 
 
Details in Exhibit F.  
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Race  
African-Americans tended to exhibit higher rates of reported misconduct than Caucasians during 
most observed years. Caucasians serving 70% sentences tended to be the only group which 
consistently declined in misconducts from year-one to year-three incarceration.  Other groups 
tended to show increasing misconduct rates during year two, with declines seen thereafter.  
 
Figure 11: Percent of Offenders with Any Misconduct by, Race and Sentence Type 
 
Details in Exhibit G.  
 
Examining offender differences by misconduct type, we see that predatory offenses tend to be 
fairly infrequent compared to institutional management violations. Caucasians serving non-70 
percent sentences and African-Americans serving 70 percent sentences followed similar trends, 
with increasing rates of predatory misconducts as time passed. Caucasians serving 70 percent 
sentences and African-Americans not serving 70 sentences also behaved similarly, with increases 
in predatory misconducts during year-two and declining in year-three.  Changes in predatory 
misconduct are minimal but evident.   
 
Observing institutional management violations, it is evident that African-Americans serving 
mandatory sentences and Caucasians serving non-70 percent sentences exhibited similar trends, 
remaining fairly stable from year-one to year-two incarceration with an increase in year-three. 
Caucasians serving a 70 percent sentence had an increase in institutional misconducts from year 
one to year-two and then starkly declined from year-two to year-three. African-Americans 
serving non-70 percent sentences had a decrease in institutional violations from year-one to year-
two followed by a stark increase in year-three, surpassing other groups. It appears that the 
percent of offenders with institutional misconduct violations increases for every group by year-
three, except for 70 percent Caucasians.  
 
Please note that the following graphs have been formatted with varying axes to more clearly 
identify trends.  
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Figure 12: Predatory Misconduct by, Race and Sentence Type 
 
Details in Exhibit G. 
 
Figure 13: Institutional Misconduct Violations by, Race and Sentence Type 
 
Details in exhibit G. 
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Sex 
Rates of misconduct were similar for males and females during the first year of incarceration in 
most categories, although one should consider these results carefully because of the small 
number of females in the cohort.  Generally, females in the 70 percent group exhibited higher 
percentages of total misconducts than males (76.9% vs. 59.9%), while males serving non-70 
percent sentences had slightly higher misconduct than females (63.6% vs. 54.5%). Females 
showed higher rate of predatory/violence misconducts than males (22.7% vs. 10.8%) although 
fairly proportional percentages of institutional management (45.4% vs. 50.8%) and non-
compliance misconduct violations (95.4% vs. 95.1%) were observed for both males and females.  
In the non-70 percent group, there were higher percentages of female offenders with 
predatory/violent misconduct than males (33.3% vs. 7.3%). Due to the small number of females 
in this sample, misconduct rates were only observed during the first year of incarceration.  
 
Table 4: Offender Misconducts at Year-One of Incarceration by Sentence Type and Sex 
 Non-70% Sentence 70% Sentence  Total 
 N % N % N % 
MALE 
       Predatory/Violence 6 7.3% 14 13.6% 20 10.8% 
       Institutional Management 42 51.2% 52 50.5% 94 50.8% 
       Non-Compliance 80 97.6% 96 93.2% 176 95.1% 
      Total Men w/ Misconduct 82 100% 103 100% 185 100% 
      Males w/Misconduct 82 63.6% 103 59.9% 185 61.5% 
      Males w/out Misconduct 47 36.4% 69 40.1% 116 38.5% 
     Total Male 129 100% 172 100% 301 100% 
FEMALE 
       Predatory/Violence 4 33.3% 1 10.0% 5 22.7% 
       Institutional Management 7 58.3% 3 30.0% 10 45.4% 
       Non-Compliance 11 91.7% 10 100% 21 95.4% 
     Total Female w/Misconduct 12 100% 10 100% 22 100% 
      Females w/Misconduct 12 54.5% 10 76.9% 22 62.9% 
      Females w/out Misconduct 10 45.4% 3 23.1% 13 37.1% 
    Total Female 22 100% 13 100% 35 100% 
 
 
Figure 14: Total Offender Misconduct within Year-One of Incarceration, by Sentence Type and Sex 
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Custody Classification and Facility Security Level  
 
Variations in misconduct were also observed by offender custody classification. Offenders were included 
in the analysis if their custody classification assessment submission date was within 60 days of their 
supervision start date. Offenders were eligible for analysis at year-two and year-three if they were 
reclassified within 60 days of their supervision start anniversary. Some offenders were eliminated at year-
two and three based on this requirement because of the nature of custody reclassification. For example, 
offenders may be reclassified before or after their supervision start date anniversary. This means that 
future reclassifications will occur annually from the date from which the offender was reclassified early 
or late, not necessarily around their incarceration anniversary.  In other words, an offender’s year-two 
reclassification may not be eligible for study because it did not occur within 60 days of the year-two 
incarceration anniversary. While this approach restricts the sample, it ensured uniformity throughout the 
analysis.  Additionally, restricting the reclassification dates enables observation of misconducts 
consistently throughout the report, within a particular incarceration year.  At year-one nine offenders were 
omitted because of this requirement (n=327), year-two 109 (n=192), and year-three 102 (n=162).   
 
Misconducts were observed within a particular year of incarceration and included violations which 
occurred after the custody classification or reclassification assessment submission date. Because of this 
requirement, some offenders did not have a full year incarceration length under a particular custody 
classification. If an offender had more than one custody classification within a particular year of 
incarceration, the earliest classification was chosen. 
 
Medium and minimum custody classifications have subcategories which distinguish which inmates can 
work outside of the institution (denoted as ‘work-out’). The current analysis did not distinguish between 
these subcategories. For example, an offender classified as minimum custody work-out would be defined 
here only as being minimum custody.  
 
An examination of misconduct by custody classification level revealed that the non-70 percent group 
behaved as expected, with maximum custody inmates having higher rates of misconduct than inmates 
classified as medium or minimum custody during the observed years. The 70 percent group was not as 
predictable. During year one, 70 percent inmates classified as maximum custody had lower percentages of 
misconduct than medium custody 70 percent offenders (52.0% vs. 62.9%). During year-two and year-
three the 70 percent group behaved as expected, with higher misconduct rates for offenders classified at 
higher custody levels. Misconduct rates are unavailable for some groups due to small sample sizes.  
 
Some research suggests that the security level of an institution affects inmate behavior during 
incarceration. As will be recalled, some offenders’ initial and reclassification custodies were not observed 
due to study parameters. Because of these parameters, institution security level was unavailable for some 
groups.    
 
All offenders who are admitted to prison in Iowa will initially visit the Iowa Medical and Classification 
Center (IMCC), a medium-security facility, to be transferred elsewhere. Because of this process, all 
offenders during year-one received their custody classification while incarcerated at a medium-security 
facility. Information as to the security level of each institution can be found in Attachment #2.  
 
Greater proportions of inmates were classified at medium security facilities, particularly so for the non-70 
percent group. Small sample sizes limited the examination of misconduct by facility security level for 
some groups.  It appears that, generally, offenders at maximum security facilities had higher total 
incidence of misconduct than those at medium facilities. The misconduct rate of maximum security 
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inmates tended to remain high and stable through the observed period, but misconduct rates for the 
medium and minimum custody groups tended to decline. 
 
Analysis of misconduct by facility security level revealed that there were similar percentages of total 
offenders with misconduct during year-one and year-two at medium security facilities, but this figure 
declined in year-three. During year-one, the non-70 percent and 70 percent groups had identical 
percentages of offenders with misconduct who were supervised at medium security facilities, but by year-
two, the non-70 percent offenders had higher percentages of misconduct than the 70% group (74.6% vs. 
55.8%). This trend continued into year-three.  
 
Table 5: Offender Misconduct, by Custody Classification 
 Non-70% 70% Total 
Custody 
Classification 
N 
Misconduct 
N  
Total 
% N 
Misconduct 
N 
Total 
% N 
Misconduct 
N  
Total 
% 
YEAR-ONE 
  Maximum Custody 8 9 88.9% 13 25 52.0% 21 34 61.8% 
  Medium Custody 73 116 62.9% 95 151 62.9% 168 267 62.9% 
  Minimum Custody 13 23 56.5% 3 3 -- 16 26 61.5% 
  Unavailable 0 3 -- 3 6 50.0% 3 9 33.3% 
Total  151 --  185 --  336 -- 
YEAR-TWO 
  Maximum Custody 12 14 85.7% 25 35 71.4% 37 49 75.5% 
  Medium Custody 36 48 75.0% 46 87 52.9% 82 135 60.7% 
  Minimum Custody 3 5 60.0% 1 3 -- 4 8 50.0% 
  Unavailable 26 49 53.1% 35 60 58.3% 61 109 56.0% 
Total  116 --  185 --  301 -- 
YEAR-THREE 
  Maximum Custody 6 7 85.7% 13 23 56.5% 19 30 63.3% 
  Medium Custody 20 28 71.4% 30 89 33.7% 50 117 42.7% 
  Minimum Custody 2 12 16.7% 2 3 -- 4 15 26.7% 
  Unavailable 17 32 53.1% 32 70 45.7% 49 102 48.0% 
Total  79 --  185 --  264 -- 
 
Table 6: Offender Misconduct, by Facility Security Level 
 Non-70% 70% Total 
Facility Security Level N 
Misconduct 
N 
Total 
% N 
Misconduct 
N 
Total 
% N 
Misconduct 
N 
Total 
% 
YEAR-ONE 
 Medium Facility 94 148 63.5% 110 179 61.4% 204 327 62.4% 
 Unavailable 0 3 -- 3 6 50.0% 3 9 33.3% 
Total  151 --  185 --  336 -- 
YEAR-TWO 
 Maximum Facility 3 3 -- 10 14 71.4% 13 17 76.5% 
 Medium Facility 47 63 74.6% 62 111 55.8% 109 174 62.6% 
 Minimum Facility 1 1 -- 0 0 -- 1 1 -- 
 Unavailable 26 49 53.1% 35 60 58.3% 61 109 55.9% 
Total  116 --  185 --  301 -- 
YEAR-THREE 
 Maximum Facility 2 2 -- 13 23 56.5% 15 25 60.0% 
 Medium Facility 26 44 59.1% 34 92 37.0% 60 136 44.1% 
 Minimum Facility 0 1 -- 0 0 -- 0 1 -- 
 Unavailable 17 32 53.1% 32 70 45.7% 49 102 48.0% 
Total  79 --  185 --  264 -- 
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Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) 
 
Misconduct violations were also observed by offender’s Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) 
score. As previously stated, the LSI-R is a validated risk assessment and is one of several tools used 
in Iowa to establish offender risk and level of supervision.   LSI-R scores which were gathered 180 
days prior to prison admissions or 60 days following release were utilized, as this time period meets 
Iowa Department of Corrections’ (IDOC) standards.  Because there were few offenders assessed at 
Low or Low-Moderate Risk, these categories were combined. Percentages are based on the number 
of offenders within each LSI-R level who had a misconduct report during a particular year of 
incarceration. The percentages of misconducts for the low-low/moderate non-70 percent group are 
unavailable due to low sample size. 
 
For easier comparison, the charts below are broken down by low to moderate LSI-R total scores and 
moderate to high LSI-R total scores. During year one, individuals with lower LSI-R scores had lower 
rates of misconduct. Year-two reveals relatively little change, with the exception of high risk non-70 
percent offenders whose rates jumped to 82.3%. By year-three, rates of misconduct drop for all 
offenders with the exception of the medium high non-70 percent group. Moderate to high risk 
offenders exhibited misconduct rates which tended to decline for most groups, while low to moderate 
offenders’ misconduct rates varied to greater degrees but also tended to decline.  
 
Please note the variations to chart scales below, established to more clearly identify trends. 
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 Figure 15: Low to Moderate Risk Offenders with Misconduct  
 
Details in Exhibit H. 
 
Figure 16: Moderate to High Risk Offenders with Misconduct  
 
Details in Exhibit H. 
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Percentages of misconducts for low-low/moderate non-70 percent 
offenders were unavailable due to low sample size in year-three. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
The primary purpose of this analysis was to answer the research questions:  
1.) Does having the ability to earn earned time affect an inmate’s misconduct 
engagement? And… 
2.)  Which variables are most closely associated with offender misconduct? 
 
The data suggest that, during the first three years of incarceration, misconduct rates are similar 
for those who have the ability to accrue earned time immediately compared to those who do not. 
The data show that as release nears the 70 percent group had fewer misconduct infractions and 
fewer infractions which resulted in loss of earned time than the non-70 percent groups. This is 
not surprising, as the 70 percent group was more likely to receive alternative sanctions (i.e., a 
sanction not involving the loss of earned time). Interestingly, lost earned time sanctions tended to 
be longer for the 70% than non-70% group. This does not suggest that the 70% group’s 
infractions were more serious, however, as both the 70% and non-70% groups tended to have 
similar percentages of offenders with predatory/violent misconducts.   
 
Evidence from the logistic regression analysis found that age was the strongest and most 
consistent predictor of misconduct. Also interesting is the predictive power of custody 
classification and facility security level at later periods of incarceration. Sex was also 
significantly predictive of predatory/violent misconduct during year-one. It is important to 
acknowledge that an offender’s sentence type was not a variable having significant misconduct 
predictability.  
 
While the findings from this report appear to suggest that earned time has little influence on 
offender misconduct, it is important to acknowledge the possible effects that removal of the 
policy could have on misconduct rates. While findings suggest that the rates of misconduct are 
higher for the non-70% than the 70% group, it is possible that absent earned time policies, 
misconduct rates could increase or decrease.  
 
It should also be said that these findings should not necessarily lead toward abolishment or 
modification of current earned time practices.  Simply doing away with earned time, within 
Iowa’s current sentencing structure, would result in a nearly immediate rise in prison population.  
While the Board of Parole has the statutory ability to release most inmates at any point during a 
sentence, an inmate’s proximity to his or her absolute discharge date is one factor considered by 
the Board in its release deliberations.  A substantial percentage of Iowa inmates also are also 
discharged directly from institutions when their sentences expire (either as a first release or after 
previous release opportunities). While abolishing or reducing the opportunity for earned time 
may be attractive in terms of “truth in sentencing,” such a change should not be made without 
considering the possible impact on the size of Iowa’s prison population. 
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EXHIBIT A 
 
Table 7: Offender Misconduct Occurring within a Total Period of Incarceration 
 Non-70% Sentence 70% Sentence  Total 
 N % N % N % 
ONE-YEAR 
     Predatory/Violence 10 10.6% 15 13.3% 25 12.1% 
     Institutional Management 49 52.1% 55 48.7% 104 50.2% 
     Non-Compliance 91 96.8% 106 93.8% 197 95.2% 
 Total Offenders w/Misconduct 94 -- 113 -- 207 -- 
    Offenders w/Misconduct 94 62.2% 113 61.1% 207 61.6% 
    Offenders w/out Misconducts 57 37.7% 72 38.9% 129 38.4% 
    Total Offenders 151 100% 185 100% 336 100% 
 
TWO-YEAR 
     Predatory/Violence 20 22.5% 33 23.7% 53 23.2% 
     Institutional Management 53 59.5% 91 65.5% 144 63.2% 
     Non-Compliance 88 98.9% 132 95.0% 220 96.5% 
 Total Offenders w/Misconduct 89 -- 139 -- 228 -- 
    Offenders w/ Misconduct 89 76.7% 139 75.1% 228 75.7% 
    Offenders w/out Misconducts 27 23.3% 46 24.9% 73 24.2% 
    Total Offenders 116 100% 185 100% 301 100% 
 
THREE-YEAR  
     Predatory/Violence 19 28.8% 39 26.7% 58 27.3% 
     Institutional Management 53 80.3% 103 70.5% 156 73.6% 
     Non-Compliance 64 97.0% 139 95.2% 203 95.7% 
 Total Offenders w/Misconduct 66 -- 146 -- 212 -- 
    Offenders w/ Misconducts 66 83.5% 146 78.9% 212 80.3% 
    Offenders w/out Misconducts 13 16.5% 39 21.1% 52 19.7% 
Total Offenders 79 100% 185 100% 264 100% 
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EXHIBIT B 
 
 Table 8: Offender Misconduct between Particular Year of Incarceration by Sentence Type 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Non-70% Sentence 70% Sentence  Total 
 N % N % N % 
ONE-YEAR 
     Predatory/Violence 10 10.6% 15 13.3% 25 12.1% 
     Institutional Management 49 52.1% 55 48.7% 104 50.2% 
     Non-Compliance 91 96.8% 106 93.8% 197 95.2% 
 Total Offenders w/Misconduct 94 -- 113 -- 207 -- 
    Offenders w/ Misconduct 94 62.2% 113 61.1% 207 61.6% 
    Offenders w/out Misconducts 57 37.7% 72 38.9% 129 38.4% 
 Total Offenders 151 100% 185 100% 336 100% 
 
TWO-YEAR 
     Predatory/Violence 15 19.5% 23 21.1% 38 20.4% 
     Institutional Management 39 50.6% 64 58.7% 103 55.4% 
     Non-Compliance* 76 98.7% 98 89.9% 174 93.5% 
 Total Offenders w/Misconduct 77 -- 109 -- 186 -- 
    Offenders w/Misconduct 77 66.4% 109 58.9% 186 61.8% 
    Offenders w/out Misconducts 39 33.6% 76 41.1% 115 38.2% 
 Total Offenders 116 100% 185 100% 301 100% 
*Significance was calculated at a 95% confidence interval 
 
THREE-YEAR 
     Predatory/Violence 10 22.2% 13 16.4% 23 18.5% 
     Institutional Management* 34 75.5% 44 55.7% 78 62.9% 
     Non-Compliance 42 93.3% 72 91.1% 114 91.9% 
 Total Offenders w/Misconduct 45 -- 79 -- 124 -- 
     Total Offenders w/Misconduct* 45 57.0% 79 42.7% 124 47.0% 
    Offenders w/out Misconducts* 34 43.0% 106 57.3% 140 53.0% 
 Total Offenders 79 100% 185 100% 264 100% 
*Significance was calculated at a 95% confidence interval. 
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EXHIBIT C 
 
Table 9: Percent of Offenders w/Misconduct by Months to Release 
 
Table 10: Infractions Resulting in Loss of Earned time by Time to Release 
 Non-70% 70% 
 N w/ET Sanction N Total % N w/ET Sanctions N Total % 
TIME-TO-RELEASE 
    > 85 Months 1 2 -- 6 14 42.9% 
    79-84 Months 1 2 -- 10 29 34.5% 
    73-78 Months 0 4 -- 12 34 35.3% 
    67-72 Months 2 6 33.3% 8 34 23.5% 
    61-66 Months 3 11 27.3% 1 34 2.9% 
    55-60 Months 6 13 46.1% 1 34 2.9% 
    49-54 Months 8 20 40.0% 2 34 5.9% 
    43-48 Months 7 25 28.0% 0 34 0.0% 
    37-42 Months 12 34 35.3% 1 34 2.9% 
    31-36 Months 8 39 20.5% 0 34 0.0% 
    25-30 Months 7 50 14.0% 0 34 0.0% 
    19-24 Months 12 59 20.3% 0 34 0.0% 
    13-18 Months 17 62 27.4% 0 34 0.0% 
      7-12 Months 14 63 22.2% 0 34 0.0% 
    < 6 Months 5 63 7.9% 0 34 0.0% 
Total Offenders 63  -- 34  -- 
- Small sample size inhibited an examination of the non-70% group’s misconduct past 78 months of incarceration. 
 
 
 Non-70% 70% 
 N Misconduct N Total % N Misconduct N Total % 
TIME TO RELEASE 
> 85 Months -- -- -- 9 22 40.9% 
79-84 Months -- -- -- 18 54 33.3% 
73-78 Months 2 5 40.0% 21 60 35.0% 
67-72 Months 3 9 33.3% 15 61 24.6% 
61-66 Months 4 16 25.0% 4 61 6.6% 
55-60 Months 7 20 35.0% 2 61 3.3% 
49-54 Months 10 32 31.2% 4 61 6.6% 
43-48 Months 13 45 28.9% 2 61 3.3% 
37-42 Months 14 60 23.3% 1 61 1.6% 
31-36 Months 17 70 24.3% 0 61 0.0% 
25-30 Months 15 88 17.0% 1 61 1.6% 
19-24 Months 22 98 22.4% 0 61 0.0% 
13-18 Months 35 110 31.8% 0 61 0.0% 
7-12 Months 14 111 12.6% 0 61 0.0% 
< 6 Months 5 111 4.5% 0 61 0.0% 
- Small sample size inhibited an examination of the non-70% group’s misconduct past 78 months of incarceration. 
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EXHIBIT C Cont… 
 
 
 
Table 11: Unsuspended Infractions Resulting in Loss of Earned time for Offenders Convicted of a C-Felony 
 Non 70% 70% Total 
 N 
Misconduct 
N 
Total 
% 
N 
Misconduct 
N 
Total 
% 
N 
Misconduct 
N 
Total 
% 
UNSUSPENDED EARNED TIME SANCTIONS 
    > 85 Months 1 1 -- 6 14 42.9% 7 15 46.7% 
    79-84 Months 0 1 -- 10 29 34.5% 10 30 33.3% 
    73-78 Months 0 3 -- 12 34 35.3% 12 37 32.4% 
    67-72 Months 0 3 -- 8 34 23.5% 8 37 21.6% 
    61-66 Months 2 6 33.3% 1 34 2.9% 3 40 7.5% 
    55-60 Months 4 8 50.0% 2 34 5.9% 6 42 14.3% 
    49-54 Months 7 14 50.0% 2 34 5.9% 9 48 18.8% 
    43-48 Months 5 18 27.8% 0 34 0.0% 5 52 9.6% 
    37-42 Months 10 26 38.5% 1 34 2.9% 11 60 18.3% 
    31-36 Months 7 31 22.6% 0 34 0.0% 7 65 10.8% 
    25-30 Months 5 38 13.2% 0 34 0.0% 5 72 6.9% 
    19-24 Months 6 41 14.6% 0 34 0.0% 6 75 8.0% 
    13-18 Months 10 43 23.2% 0 34 0.0% 10 77 13.0% 
    7-12 Months 4 43 9.3% 0 34 0.0% 4 77 5.2% 
   < 6 Months 1 43 2.3% 0 34 0.0% 1 77 1.3% 
Released Offenders w/Unsuspended ET Sanctions 43 -- -- 34 -- -- 77 -- 
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EHIBIT D 
Table 12: Offender-Based Misconduct Violation Sanctions  
 Non-70% 70% Total 
 N % N % N % 
MISCONDUCT VIOLATIONS 
Written Assignment 7 5.9% 4 2.4% 11 3.9% 
Extra Duty 8 6.7% 6 3.7% 14 4.9% 
Loss of Pay 17 14.3% 22 13.4% 39 13.8% 
Reprimand 26 21.8% 39 23.8% 65 23.0% 
Confiscation 27 22.7% 39 23.8% 66 23.3% 
Assess Costs 27 22.7% 49 29.9% 76 26.8% 
Special Conditions 34 28.6% 45 27.4% 79 27.9% 
Loss of Privilege 53 44.5% 67 40.8% 120 42.4% 
Cell/Room Confinement 71 59.7% 115 70.1% 186 65.7% 
Disciplinary Detention 97 81.5% 147 89.6% 244 86.2% 
Loss of Earned Time 111 93.3% 152 92.7% 263 92.9% 
Total Offenders w/Misconduct 119 -- 164 -- 283 -- 
   Total Offenders w/Misconduct* 119 78.8% 164 88.6% 283 84.2% 
   Total Offenders w/out Misconduct* 32 21.2% 21 11.4% 53 15.8% 
Total Offenders 151 100% 185 100% 336 100% 
*Significant at a 95% confidence interval. 
 
Table 13: Offender Based Earned time Sanctions by Amount of Earned time Lost 
 Non-70% 70% Total 
 N % N % N % 
EARNED TIME LOST 
    <7 days 63 64.9% 92 69.7% 155 67.7% 
    8-14 days 39 40.2% 43 32.6% 82 35.8% 
    15-21 days 71 73.2% 100 75.7% 171 74.7% 
    22-30 days* 18 18.5% 40 30.3% 58 25.3% 
    31-45 days 2 2.1% 9 6.8% 11 4.8% 
    46-60 days* 10 10.3% 31 23.5% 98 42.8% 
    61-90 days 13 13.4% 25 18.9% 38 16.6% 
    91-180 days 3 3.1% 8 6.1% 11 4.8% 
    181-365 days 2 2.1% 4 3.0% 6 2.6% 
Offenders w/Lost ET Sanctions 97 -- 132 -- 229 -- 
   Offenders w/Lost ET Sanctions 97 87.4% 132 86.8% 229 87.1% 
   Offenders w/ Deferred ET Sanctions 78 70.3% 110 72.4% 188 71.5% 
Offenders w/ET Sanctions 111 -- 152 -- 263 -- 
*Significant at a 95% confidence interval. 
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EXHIBIT E 
 
Table 14: Logistic Regression Model: Significant Predictors of Misconduct amongst the Robbery 
Cohort 
       Confidence Interval 
 B S.E. Wald Df Sig Exp(B) Lower Upper 
YEAR-ONE 
Any Misconduct 
     Age -.625 .171 13.34 1 .000 0.53 0.38 0.74 
Predatory Misconduct 
     Sex 1.11 .572 3.83 1 .050 3.06 .998 9.38 
Institutional Management 
     Age -.602 .178 11.48 1 .001 .548 .386 .776 
Non-Compliance 
     Age -.601 .168 12.73 1 .000 .548 .394 .763 
YEAR-TWO 
Any Misconduct 
     Age -.888 .195 20.78 1 .000 .412 .281 .603 
    Facility Security Level .962 .392 6.01 1 .014 2.61 1.21 5.64 
Predatory Misconduct 
     Facility Security Level .827 .381 4.70 1 .030 2.28 1.08 4.82 
Institutional Management 
     Age -.519 .185 7.82 1 .005 .595 .414 .856 
     Facility Security Level .635 .318 3.97 1 .046 1.88 1.01 3.52 
Non-Compliance 
     Age -.981 .195 25.28 1 .000 0.37 .256 .550 
Facility Security Level .809 .363 4.96 1 .026 2.24 1.10 4.57 
YEAR-THREE 
Any Misconduct 
     Age -.679 .198 11.72 1 .001 .507 .344 .748 
     Custody Classification -.454 .196 5.35 1 .021 .635 .433 .933 
Predatory Misconduct 
     Age -.757 .359 4.44 1 .035 .469 .232 .948 
Institutional Management 
     Age -.623 .219 8.13 1 .004 .536 .349 .823 
     Custody Classification -.602 .212 8.04 1 .005 .547 .361 .830 
Facility Security Level .935 .319 8.60 1 .003 2.54 1.36 4.75 
Non-Compliance 
     Age -.783 .205 14.63 1 .000 .457 .306 .683 
     Custody Classification -.574 .200 8.23 1 .004 .563 .381 .834 
     Facility Security Level .752 .314 5.73 1 .017 2.12 1.14 3.92 
Detail in Exhibit E. 
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EXHIBIT E CONTINUED… 
 
Table 15: Logistic Regression Model: Significant Predictors of Misconduct at Year-One 
       Confidence Interval 
 B S.E. Wald Df Sig Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Any Misconduct 
     Age -.625 .171 13.34 1 .000 0.53 0.38 0.74 
     Sex .126 .392 .104 1 .748 1.13 0.52 2.44 
     Race .321 .224 2.04 1 .152 1.37 .888 2.13 
     Sentence Type -.060 .330 .033 1 .856 .942 .493 1.79 
     Convicting Offense .196 .343 .326 1 .568 1.21 .621 2.38 
     LSI-R -.081 .080 1.02 1 .311 0.92 .789 1.07 
     Custody Classification .228 .224 1.03 1 .308 1.25 .810 1.94 
Predatory Misconduct 
     Age -.446 .309 2.08 1 .149 .640 0.34 1.17 
     Sex 1.11 .572 3.83 1 .050 3.06 .998 9.38 
     Race .431 .386 1.24 1 .264 1.53 .722 3.28 
     Sentence Type .429 .614 .488 1 .485 1.53 .461 5.10 
     Convicting Offense -.130 .647 .040 1 .841 .878 .247 3.12 
     LSI-R .001 .148 .000 1 .993 1.00 .750 1.33 
     Custody Classification .311 .438 .505 1 .477 1.36 .578 3.22 
Institutional Management 
     Age -.602 .178 11.48 1 .001 .548 .386 .776 
     Sex -.004 .415 .000 1 .992 .996 .441 2.24 
     Race .180 .227 .625 1 .429 1.19 .766 1.87 
     Sentence Type -.054 .341 .025 1 .873 .947 .485 1.84 
     Convicting Offense .011 .351 .001 1 .976 1.01 .508 2.01 
     LSI-R .058 .084 .485 1 .486 1.06 .899 1.25 
     Custody Classification .256 .255 1.00 1 .315 1.29 .784 2.12 
Non-Compliance 
     Age -.601 .168 12.73 1 .000 .548 .394 .763 
     Sex .072 .386 .034 1 .853 1.07 .504 2.28 
     Race .215 .219 .961 1 .327 1.24 .807 1.90 
     Sentence Type -.174 .327 .282 1 .595 .841 .443 1.59 
     Convicting Offense .291 .340 .732 1 .392 1.33 .687 2.60 
     LSI-R -.090 .079 1.30 1 .254 0.91 .783 1.06 
     Custody Classification .263 .224 1.38 1 .240 1.30 .839 2.01 
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EXHIBIT E CONT… 
 
Table 16: Logistic Regression Model: Significant Predictors of Misconduct at Year-Two 
       Confidence Interval 
 B S.E. Wald Df Sig Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Any Misconduct 
     Age -.888 .195 20.78 1 .000 .412 .281 .603 
     Sex .017 .447 .001 1 .970 1.01 .423 2.44 
     Race .474 .248 3.64 1 .056 1.60 .988 2.61 
     Sentence Type .064 .399 .026 1 .872 1.06 .488 2.33 
     Convicting Offense -.596 .428 1.93 1 .164 .551 .238 1.27 
     LSI-R -.079 .088 .793 1 .373 .924 .778 1.09 
     Custody Classification -.382 .226 2.85 1 .091 .682 .438 1.06 
    Facility Security Level .962 .392 6.01 1 .014 2.61 1.21 5.64 
Predatory Misconduct 
     Age -.229 .256 .798 1 .372 .796 .482 1.31 
     Sex .713 .572 1.55 1 .213 2.04 .664 6.26 
     Race .402 .333 1.45 1 .228 1.49 .778 2.87 
     Sentence Type -.444 .521 .726 1 .394 .641 .231 1.78 
     Convicting Offense .488 .564 .751 1 .386 1.63 .540 4.91 
     LSI-R .041 .122 .113 1 .737 1.04 .821 1.32 
     Custody Classification -.486 .270 3.22 1 .072 .615 .362 1.04 
     Facility Security Level .827 .381 4.70 1 .030 2.28 1.08 4.82 
Institutional Management 
     Age -.519 .185 7.82 1 .005 .595 .414 .856 
     Sex .329 .446 .544 1 .461 1.39 .580 3.33 
     Race -.022 .238 .009 1 .925 .978 .613 1.56 
     Sentence Type .429 .415 1.06 1 .301 1.53 .681 3.46 
     Convicting Offense -.427 .428 .996 1 .318 .652 .282 1.50 
     LSI-R -.083 .086 .920 1 .338 .921 .778 1.09 
     Custody Classification -.232 .199 1.35 1 .244 .793 .537 1.17 
     Facility Security Level .635 .318 3.97 1 .046 1.88 1.01 3.52 
Non-Compliance 
     Age -.981 .195 25.28 1 .000 0.37 .256 .550 
     Sex .169 .452 .140 1 .708 1.18 .488 2.87 
     Race .441 .246 3.22 1 .072 1.55 .961 2.51 
     Sentence Type -.113 .397 .081 1 .776 .893 .411 1.94 
     Convicting Offense -.615 .425 2.10 1 .147 .540 .235 1.24 
     LSI-R -.072 .087 .687 1 .407 .930 .784 1.10 
     Custody Classification -.347 .217 2.56 1 .110 .707 .462 1.08 
     Facility Security Level .809 .363 4.96 1 .026 2.24 1.10 4.57 
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EXHIBIT E CONT… 
 
Table 17: Logistic Regression Model: Significant Predictors of Misconduct at Year-Two 
       Confidence Interval 
 B S.E. Wald Df Sig Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Any Misconduct 
     Age -.679 .198 11.72 1 .001 .507 .344 .748 
     Sex .433 .478 .818 1 .366 1.54 .604 3.93 
     Race .222 .250 .793 1 .373 1.24 .766 2.03 
     Sentence Type -.144 .444 .105 1 .745 .866 .363 2.06 
     Convicting Offense -.656 .474 1.91 1 .167 .519 .205 1.31 
     LSI-R -.028 .092 .093 1 .761 .972 .812 1.16 
     Custody Classification -.454 .196 5.35 1 .021 .635 .433 .933 
    Facility Security Level .602 .311 3.74 1 .053 1.82 .992 3.36 
Predatory Misconduct 
     Age -.757 .359 4.44 1 .035 .469 .232 .948 
     Sex 1.16 .681 2.92 1 .087 3.20 .844 12.20 
     Race -.497 .474 1.09 1 .295 .608 .240 1.54 
     Sentence Type .596 .832 .513 1 .474 1.81 .355 9.27 
     Convicting Offense -1.44 .824 3.07 1 .080 .236 .047 1.18 
     LSI-R -.201 .158 1.63 1 .201 .818 .600 1.11 
     Custody Classification -.221 .315 .491 1 .484 .802 .432 1.48 
     Facility Security Level .332 .493 .452 1 .501 1.39 .530 3.66 
Institutional Management 
     Age -.623 .219 8.13 1 .004 .536 .349 .823 
     Sex .026 .549 .002 1 .963 1.02 .350 3.01 
     Race .368 .275 1.79 1 .180 1.44 .843 2.47 
     Sentence Type -.715 .473 2.28 1 .130 .489 .194 1.23 
     Convicting Offense -.497 .494 1.01 1 .314 .608 .231 1.60 
     LSI-R -.035 .102 .117 1 .732 .966 .792 1.17 
     Custody Classification -.602 .212 8.04 1 .005 .547 .361 .830 
     Facility Security Level .935 .319 8.60 1 .003 2.54 1.36 4.75 
Non-Compliance 
     Age -.783 .205 14.63 1 .000 .457 .306 .683 
     Sex .651 .485 1.80 1 .179 1.91 .742 4.95 
     Race .046 .254 .033 1 .856 1.04 .636 1.72 
     Sentence Type -.026 .451 .003 1 .955 .975 .403 2.35 
     Convicting Offense -.797 .480 2.75 1 .097 .451 .176 1.15 
     LSI-R -.019 .094 .040 1 .841 .981 .817 1.17 
     Custody Classification -.574 .200 8.23 1 .004 .563 .381 .834 
     Facility Security Level .752 .314 5.73 1 .017 2.12 1.14 3.92 
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EXHIBIT F 
 
Table 18: Offender Misconducts by Sentence Type and Age at Prison Entry 
 Non-70% 70% Total 
 N Misconduct N Total % N Misconduct N Total % N Misconduct N Total % 
YEAR-ONE 
 29 and Younger 61 90 67.8% 74 107 69.2% 135 197 68.5% 
 30 and Older 33 61 54.1% 39 78 50.0% 72 139 51.8% 
Total -- 151 -- -- 185 -- -- 336 -- 
YEAR-TWO 
 29 and Younger 53 72 73.6% 74 107 69.2% 127 179 70.9% 
 30 and Older 24 44 54.5% 35 78 44.9% 59 122 48.4% 
Total -- 116 -- -- 185 -- -- 301 -- 
YEAR-THREE 
 29 and Younger* 36 49 73.5% 55 107 51.4% 91 156 58.3% 
 30 and Older 9 30 30.0% 24 78 30.8% 33 108 30.5% 
Total -- 79 -- -- 185 -- -- 264 -- 
*Significant at a 95% confidence interval. 
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EXHIBIT G 
 
Table 19: Percent of Offenders with Any Misconduct by, Race and Sentence Type 
 Caucasian 
 Non-70% Sentence 70% Sentence 
 N Misconduct N Total % N Miscdct N Total % 
Year-One 53 94 56.4% 51 87 58.6% 
Year-Two 43 71 60.6% 44 87 50.6% 
Year- Three 25 49 51.0% 34 87 39.1% 
 
 African-American 
 Non-70% Sentence 70% Sentence 
 N Misconduct N Total % N Misconduct Total % 
Year-One 39 55 70.9% 59 93 63.4% 
Year-Two 33 44 75.0% 63 93 67.7% 
Year- Three 19 29 65.5% 44 93 47.3% 
 
 
Table 20: Year-One Misconducts, by Race 
 Non-70% Sentence 70% Sentence  Total 
 N % N % N % 
AFRICAN-AMERICAN 
       Predatory/Violence 5 12.8% 10 16.9% 15 15.3% 
       Institutional Management 19 48.7% 29 49.2% 48 49.0% 
       Non-Compliance 37 94.9% 56 94.9% 93 94.9% 
 Total A-A w/Misconduct 39 -- 59 -- 98 -- 
      Total A-A w/Misconduct 39 70.9% 59 63.4% 98 66.2% 
      Total A-A w/out Misconduct 16 29.1% 34 36.6% 50 33.8% 
 Total African-American 55 100% 93 100% 148 100% 
CAUCASIAN 
       Predatory/Violence 5 9.4% 5 9.8% 10 9.6% 
       Institutional Management 30 56.6% 23 45.1% 53 51.0% 
       Non-Compliance 52 98.1% 48 94.1% 100 96.2% 
 Total Caucasian w/Misconduct 53 -- 51 -- 104 -- 
       Total Caucasian w/Misconduct 53 56.4% 51 58.6% 104 57.5% 
       Total Caucasian w/out Misconduct 41 43.6% 36 41.4% 77 42.5% 
 Total Caucasian 94 100% 87 100% 181 100% 
OTHER RACE 2 -- 5 -- 7 -- 
TOTAL OFFENDERS 151 100% 185 100% 336 100% 
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EXHIBIT G CONT… 
Table 21: Year-Two Misconducts, by Race 
 Non-70% Sentence 70% Sentence  Total 
 N % N % N % 
AFRICAN-AMERICAN 
       Predatory/Violence 8 24.2% 12 19.0% 20 20.8% 
       Institutional Management 13 39.4% 33 52.4% 46 47.9% 
       Non-Compliance 33 100% 58 92.1% 91 94.8% 
 Total A-A w/Misconduct 33 -- 63 -- 96 -- 
      Total A-A w/Misconduct 33 75.0% 63 67.7% 96 70.1% 
      Total A-A w/out Misconduct 11 25.0% 30 32.3% 41 30.0% 
 Total African-American 44 100% 93 100% 137 100% 
CAUCASIAN 
       Predatory/Violence 7 16.3% 10 22.7% 17 19.5% 
       Institutional Management 25 58.1% 29 65.9% 54 62.1% 
       Non-Compliance 42 97.7% 39 88.6% 81 93.1% 
 Total Caucasians w/Misconduct 43 -- 44 -- 87 -- 
       Total Caucasian w/Misconduct 43 60.6% 44 50.6% 87 55.1% 
       Total Caucasian w/out Misconduct 28 39.4% 43 49.4% 71 44.9% 
 Total Caucasian 71 100% 87 100% 158 100% 
OTHER RACE 01 -- 5 -- 06 -- 
TOTAL OFFENDERS 116 -- 185 -- 301 -- 
 
 
 
Table 22: Year-Three Misconducts, by Race 
 Non-70% Sentence 70% Sentence  Total 
 N % N % N % 
AFRICAN-AMERICAN 
       Predatory/Violence 3 15.8% 10 22.7% 13 20.6% 
       Institutional Management 15 78.9% 28 63.6% 43 68.2% 
       Non-Compliance 17 89.5% 38 86.4% 55 87.3% 
   Total A-A w/Misconduct 19 -- 44 -- 63 -- 
        A-A w/Misconduct 19 65.5% 44 47.3% 63 51.6% 
        A-A w/out Misconduct 10 34.5% 49 52.7% 59 48.4% 
      Total African-American 29 100% 93 100% 122 100% 
CAUCASIAN 
       Predatory/Violence 7 28.0% 3 8.8% 10 16.9% 
       Institutional Management* 18 72.0% 16 47.1% 34 57.6% 
       Non-Compliance 24 96.0% 33 97.1% 57 96.6% 
   Total Caucasian w/Misconduct 25 -- 34 -- 59 -- 
        Caucasian w/Misconduct 25 51.0% 34 39.1% 59 43.4% 
        Caucasian w/out Misconduct 24 49.0% 53 60.9% 77 56.6% 
   Total Caucasian 49 100% 87 100% 136 100% 
OTHER RACE  01 -- 05 -- 06 -- 
TOTAL OFFENDERS 79 -- 185 -- 264 -- 
*Significant at a 95% confidence interval. 
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EXHIBIT H 
 
Table 23: Offender Misconduct by, LSI-R Risk 
 Non-70% 70% Total 
 N 
Misconduct 
N  
Total 
% N 
Misconduct 
N Total % N 
Misconduct 
N Total % 
YEAR-ONE          
Low/Low-Moderate  Risk 6 11 54.5% 6 12 50.0% 12 23 52.2% 
 Moderate Risk 13 27 48.1% 20 36 55.5% 33 63 52.4% 
Medium-High Risk 27 41 65.8% 25 37 67.6% 52 78 66.7% 
High Risk 17 24 70.8% 14 20 70.0% 31 44 70.4% 
Unavailable 31 48 64.6% 48 80 60.0% 79 128 61.7% 
Total  151 --  185 --  336 -- 
YEAR-TWO          
Low/Low-Moderate Risk 5 8 62.5% 6 12 50.0% 11 20 55.0% 
Moderate Risk 14 23 60.9% 18 36 50.0% 32 59 54.2% 
Medium-High Risk 17 29 58.6% 24 37 64.9% 41 66 62.1% 
High Risk 14 17 82.3% 14 20 70.0% 28 37 75.7% 
Unavailable 27 39 69.2% 47 80 58.8% 74 119 62.2% 
Total  116 --  185 --  301 -- 
YEAR-THREE          
Low/Low-Moderate Risk 0 3 -- 3 12 25.0% 3 15 20.0% 
Moderate Risk 9 16 56.2% 14 36 38.9% 23 52 44.2% 
Medium-High Risk 11 18 61.1% 18 37 48.6% 29 55 52.7% 
High Risk 7 11 63.6% 8 20 40.0% 15 31 48.4% 
Unavailable 18 31 58.1% 36 80 45.0% 54 111 48.6% 
Total  79 -- 185 185 --  264 -- 
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ATTACHMENT #1 
 
Table 24: IDOC Rule Violations Categorized by Threat to Institutional Safety and Security 
Category Rule Number and Description 
Predatory/Violence 
#1 Killing 
#2 Assault 
#3 Kidnapping 
#4 Extortion, Blackmail, Protections (strong-arming) 
#6 Rioting 
#7 Arson 
#8 Robbery 
#11 Criminal Conduct 
#13 Fighting (Class B) 
#14 Threats/Intimidation (Class B) or (Class A) 
#15 Sexual Misconduct (Class B) 
#42 Unauthorized Group/Gang Conduct 
#43 Attempted of Complicity (Class A) 
Institutional Management 
#5 Escape 
#9 Possession of Dangerous Contraband 
#10 Dealing in Dangerous Drugs/Intoxicants 
#12 Possession of Key or Key Pattern 
#13 Fighting (Class C) 
#14 Threats/Intimidation (Class C) 
#15 Sexual Misconduct (Class C) 
#16 Unauthorized Possession/Exchange (Class C) 
#18 Theft 
#19 Tampering/Interfering with Locks or Security Items 
#20 Possession of Drugs, Intoxicants 
#27 Obstructive/Disruptive Conduct (Class B) 
#28 Counterfeiting/Forging 
#29 Being Intoxicated or Under the Influence 
#30 Gambling/Debts/etc. (Class C) 
#31 Attempted Suicide, Self-Mutilation 
#33 Bartering, Selling Goods, Etc. 
#38 Adulteration of Food or Drink 
#43 Attempt or Complicity (Class B) 
Non-Compliance (Control/Disruption of 
Facility) 
#16 unauthorized Possession/Exchange (Class D) 
#17 Damage to Property 
#21 Abuse of Medication 
#22 Refusal to Work 
#23 Disobeying a Lawful Order/Direction 
#24 Violating a Condition of Leave/Furlough (Class C) 
#25 Out of Place of Assignment 
#26 Verbal Abuse 
#27 Obstructive/Disruptive Conduct (Class C) 
#30 Gambling/Debts/etc. (Class D) 
#32 Bribery 
#35 False Statements 
#36 Refusal or Failing to Participate in Treatment 
#37 Habitual Minor Offender 
#39 Safety and Sanitation (Class C) 
#40 Misuse of Mail, Telephone, or other Communication 
#43 Attempt or Complicity (Class C) 
Miscellaneous 
#34 Entering into Contracts/Agreements, Operating Business 
#39 Safety and Sanitation (Class D) 
#43 Attempt or Complicity (Class D) 
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ATTACHMENT #2 
 
Table 25: Prison Facility by Security Level 
Prison Facility Security Level 
Anamosa State Penitentiary Medium* 
Anamosa – Luster Heights Minimum 
Clarinda Correctional Facility Medium 
Clarinda – Lodge Minimum 
Fort Dodge Correctional Facility Medium 
Iowa Correctional Institute for Women Medium** 
Iowa Medical & Classification Center Medium 
Iowa State Penitentiary Maximum 
ISP – Clinical Care Unit Maximum 
ISP – John Bennett Unit Medium 
Mount Pleasant Correctional Facility Medium 
Mount Pleasant – Women’s Unit Medium 
Newton Correctional Facility Medium 
Newton – Correctional Release Center Minimum 
North Central Correctional Facility Minimum 
Prison in Other State All 
*This facility is permitted to house some maximum security offenders.  
** This facility is permitted to house offenders of all security levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
